Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013). Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. Palgrave.
Antony, L. (1995). "Sisters, Please, I'd Rather do it Myself." Philosophical Topics, 23, 59-94.
Baehr, J. (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and VirtueEpistemology. Oxford University Press.
Ballantyne, N. (2019). Knowing our Limits. Oxford University Press.
Battaly, H. (2016a). "Epistemic Virtue and Vice: Reliabilism, Responsibilism, and Personalism." In C. Mi, M. Slote, & E. Sosa (Eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese philosophy (pp. 99– 120). Routledge.
Battaly, H. (2016b). "Developing Virtue and Rehabilitating Vice: Worries About Self‐Cultivation and Self‐Reform." Journal of Moral Education, 45, 207–222.
Bishop, M. A. (2005). "The Autonomy of Social Epistemology." Episteme, 2, 65– 78.
Carter, J. A., & Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology. Routledge.
Christensen, D. (2007). "The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review, 116, 187–218.
Coady, C. A. J. (2002). "Testimony and Intellectual Autonomy." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 33(2), 355–372.
Constantin, J., Grundmann, T. (2020). "Epistemic Authority: Preemption Through Source Sensitive Defeat." Synthese,197, 4109–4130.
Dellsen, F. (2020). "The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100, 344-361.
Descartes, R. (1628/1985). "Rules for the Direction of the Mind.' In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Vol. I). Cambridge University Press.
Dormandy, K. (2018). "Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?" Erkenntnis, 83(4), 773-791.
Driver, J. (2006). "Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise." Philosophical Studies, 128(3), 619-644.
Ebels-Duggan, K. (2014). "Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue." In H. Brighouse & M. MacPherson (Eds.), The Aims of Higher Education. University of Chicago Press.
Elga, A. (2007). "Reflection and Disagreement." Noûs, 41, 478–502.
Elgin, C. Z. (2013). "Epistemic Agency." Theory and Research in Education, 11(2), 135–152.
Elgin, C. Z. (2015). "The Commonwealth of Epistemic Ends." In J. Matheson & R. Vitz (Eds.),The Ethics of Belief (pp. 244-260). Oxford University Press.
Encabo, J. V. (2008). "Epistemic Merit, Autonomy, and Testimony." Theoria, 23(61), 45–56.
Faulkner, P. (unpublished manuscript). "Disagreement and the Problem of Expert Testimony."
Feldman, R. (2006). "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In L. M. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life (pp. 194–214). Oxford University Press.
Foley, R. (2001). Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge University Press.
Foley, R. (1994). "Egoism in Epistemology." In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge (pp. 53-73). Rowman & Littlefield.
Fricker, E. (2006). "Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy." In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (pp. 225–251). Oxford University Press.
Fricker, E. (2006). "Second-Hand Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(3), 592–618.
Goldberg, S. (2013). "Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond." Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47(2), 168–186.
Goldberg, S. (2010). Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Goldberg, S. (2011). "If That Were True I Would Have Heard About it by Now." In A. Goldman & D. Whitcomb (Eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (pp. 92-108). Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. I. (2001). "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, 85–110.
Grasswick, H. (2018). "Epistemic Autonomy in a Social World of Knowing." In H. Battaly (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (pp. 196-208). Routledge.
Grundmann, T. (2019). "How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View." Philosophical Issues, 29, 129–142.
Grundmann, T. (Forthcoming). "Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical Thinking Mislead Cognition." In S. Bernecker, A. Floweree, & T. Grundmann (Eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hardwig, J. (1985). "Epistemic Dependence." The Journal of Philosophy, 82, 335–349.
Hardwig, J. (1991). "The Role of Trust in Knowledge." The Journal of Philosophy, 88, 693–708.
Hazlett, A. (2016). "The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94, 131–151.
Howell, R. (2014). "Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference." Noûs, 48(3), 389-415.
Jager, C. (2016). "Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding." Episteme, 13(2), 167-185.
Kant, I. (1784/1991). "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" In H. Reiss (Ed.), Political Writings (2nd ed., pp. 54–60). Cambridge University Press.
Kawall, J. (2002). "Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues." Ratio, 15(3), 257–275.
Kelly, T. (2005). "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement." In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 1, pages 167–196). Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2010). "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence." In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Ed.), Disagreement (pp. 111–174). Oxford University Press.
King, N. (2021). The Excellent Mind: Intellectual Virtue for the Everyday Life. Oxford University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1990). "The Division of Cognitive Labor." Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5–21.
Lackey, J. (2010). "A Justificationalist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance." In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Social Epistemology (pp. 298–325). Oxford University Press.
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2004). "An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem." In P. Catton & G. Macdonald (Eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals (pp. 128–58). Routledge.
Locke, J. (1689/1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Clarendon Press.
Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (Eds.). (2000). Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford University Press.
Matheson, J. (2015). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Palgrave Macmillan.
Matheson, J., & Lougheed, K. (2022). (Eds.). Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.
McGrath, S. (2009). "The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference." Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1), 321-344.
McMyler, B. (2011). Testimony, Trust, and Authority. Oxford University Press.
Mogensen, A. L. (2015). "Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(3), 1-24.
Nguyen, C. T. (2018). "Expertise and the Fragmentation of Intellectual Autonomy."Philosophical Inquiries, 6(2), 107-124
Nguyen, C. T. (2020). "Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts." Synthese, 197, 2803–2821.
Ranalli, C. (2020). "The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony." European Journal of Philosophy, 28(1), 142-163.
Raz, J. (1988). The Morality of Freedom. Clarendon Press.
Roberts, R. C., & Woods, W. J. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Scanlon, T. (1972). "A Theory of Freedom of Expression." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(2), 204-226.
Shieber, J. (2010). "Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2), 327-348.
Schmitt, F. (1987). "Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy." Synthese 73(1), 43-85.
Tsai, G. (2014). "Rational Persuasion as Paternalism." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 42(1), 78-112.
Westlund, A. C. (2012). "Autonomy in Relation." In S. L. Crasnow & A. M. Superson (Eds.), Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy (pp. 59–81). Oxford University Press.
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard‐Snyder, D. (2017). "Intellectual Humility: Owning our Limitations." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94, 509– 539.
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2021). "The Puzzle of Humility and Disparity." In M. Alfano, M. Lynch, & A. Tanesini (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility (pp. 72-83). Routledge.
Zagzebski, L. (2007). "Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy." Episteme, 4, 252–263.
Zagzebski, L. (2013). "Intellectual Autonomy." Philosophical Issues, 23, 244–261.
Zagzebski, L. (2012). Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford University Press