Epistemic Autonomy Bibliography
  • Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013). Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. Palgrave.
  • Antony, L. (1995). "Sisters, Please, I'd Rather do it Myself." Philosophical Topics, 23, 59-94.
  • Baehr, J. (2011). The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  • Ballantyne, N. (2019). Knowing our Limits. Oxford University Press.
  • Battaly, H. (2016a). "Epistemic Virtue and Vice: Reliabilism, Responsibilism, and Personalism." In C. Mi, M. Slote, & E. Sosa (Eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese philosophy (pp. 99– 120). Routledge.
  • Battaly, H. (2016b). "Developing Virtue and Rehabilitating Vice: Worries About Self‐Cultivation and Self‐Reform." Journal of Moral Education, 45, 207–222.
  • Bishop, M. A. (2005). "The Autonomy of Social Epistemology." Episteme, 2, 65– 78.
  • Carter, J. A., & Broncano-Berrocal, F. (2021) The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology. Routledge. 
  • Christensen, D. (2007). "The Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review, 116, 187–218.
  • Coady, C. A. J. (2002). "Testimony and Intellectual Autonomy." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 33(2), 355–372.
  • Constantin, J., Grundmann, T. (2020). "Epistemic Authority: Preemption Through Source Sensitive Defeat." Synthese, 197, 4109–4130.
  • Dellsen, F. (2020). "The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100, 344-361.
  • Descartes, R. (1628/1985). "Rules for the Direction of the Mind.' In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Vol. I). Cambridge University Press.
  • Dormandy, K. (2018). "Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?" Erkenntnis, 83(4), 773-791.
  • Driver, J. (2006). "Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise." Philosophical Studies, 128(3), 619-644.
  • Ebels-Duggan, K. (2014). "Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue." In H. Brighouse & M. MacPherson (Eds.), The Aims of Higher Education. University of Chicago Press. 
  • Elga, A. (2007). "Reflection and Disagreement." Noûs, 41, 478–502.
  • Elgin, C. Z. (2013). "Epistemic Agency." Theory and Research in Education, 11(2), 135–152.
  • Elgin, C. Z. (2015). "The Commonwealth of Epistemic Ends." In J. Matheson & R. Vitz (Eds.),The Ethics of Belief (pp. 244-260). Oxford University Press.
  • Encabo, J. V. (2008). "Epistemic Merit, Autonomy, and Testimony." Theoria, 23(61), 45–56.
  • Faulkner, P. (unpublished manuscript). "Disagreement and the Problem of Expert Testimony."
  • Feldman, R. (2006). "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In L. M. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life (pp. 194–214). Oxford University Press.
  • Foley, R. (2001). Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge University Press.
  • Foley, R. (1994). "Egoism in Epistemology." In F. Schmitt (Ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge (pp. 53-73). Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Fricker, E. (2006). "Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy." In J. Lackey & E. Sosa (Eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony (pp. 225–251). Oxford University Press.
  • Fricker, E. (2006). "Second-Hand Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73(3), 592–618.
  • Goldberg, S. (2013). "Epistemic Dependence in Testimonial Belief, in the Classroom and Beyond." Journal of Philosophy of Education, 47(2), 168–186.
  • Goldberg, S. (2010). Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  • Goldberg, S. (2011). "If That Were True I Would Have Heard About it by Now." In A. Goldman & D. Whitcomb (Eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (pp. 92-108). Oxford University Press.
  • Goldman, A. I. (2001). "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, 85–110.
  • Grasswick, H. (2018). "Epistemic Autonomy in a Social World of Knowing." In H. Battaly (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (pp. 196-208). Routledge.
  • Grundmann, T. (2019). "How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View." Philosophical Issues, 29, 129–142.
  • Grundmann, T. (Forthcoming). "Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical Thinking Mislead Cognition." In S. Bernecker, A. Floweree, & T. Grundmann (Eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Hardwig, J. (1985). "Epistemic Dependence." The Journal of Philosophy, 82, 335–349.
  • Hardwig, J. (1991). "The Role of Trust in Knowledge." The Journal of Philosophy, 88, 693–708.
  • Hazlett, A. (2016). "The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief." Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94, 131–151.
  • Howell, R. (2014). "Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference." Noûs, 48(3), 389-415.
  • Jager, C. (2016). "Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding." Episteme, 13(2), 167-185.
  • Kant, I. (1784/1991). "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" In H. Reiss (Ed.), Political Writings (2nd ed., pp. 54–60). Cambridge University Press.
  • Kawall, J. (2002). "Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues." Ratio, 15(3), 257–275.
  • Kelly, T. (2005). "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement." In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 1, pages 167–196). Oxford University Press.
  • Kelly, T. (2010). "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence." In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Ed.), Disagreement (pp. 111–174). Oxford University Press.
  • King, N. (2021). The Excellent Mind: Intellectual Virtue for the Everyday Life. Oxford University Press.
  • Kitcher, P. (1990). "The Division of Cognitive Labor." Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5–21.
  • Lackey, J. (2010). "A Justificationalist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance." In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Social Epistemology (pp. 298–325). Oxford University Press.
  • List, C., & Pettit, P. (2004). "An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem." In P. Catton & G. Macdonald (Eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals (pp. 128–58). Routledge.
  • Locke, J. (1689/1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Clarendon Press.
  • Mackenzie, C., & Stoljar, N. (Eds.). (2000). Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. Oxford University Press.
  • Matheson, J. (2015). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Matheson, J., & Lougheed, K. (2022). (Eds.). Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.
  • McGrath, S. (2009). "The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference." Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1), 321-344.  
  • McMyler, B. (2011). Testimony, Trust, and Authority. Oxford University Press.
  • Mogensen, A. L. (2015). "Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(3), 1-24.  
  • Nguyen, C. T. (2018). "Expertise and the Fragmentation of Intellectual Autonomy." Philosophical Inquiries, 6(2), 107-124
  • Nguyen, C. T. (2020). "Cognitive Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers: Problems for Epistemic Dependence on Experts." Synthese, 197, 2803–2821.
  • Ranalli, C. (2020). "The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony." European Journal of Philosophy, 28(1), 142-163.
  • Raz, J. (1988). The Morality of Freedom. Clarendon Press.
  • Roberts, R. C., & Woods, W. J. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  • Scanlon, T. (1972). "A Theory of Freedom of Expression." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(2), 204-226.
  • Shieber, J. (2010). "Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(2), 327-348.
  • Schmitt, F. (1987). "Justification, Sociality, and Autonomy." Synthese 73(1), 43-85.
  • Tsai, G. (2014). "Rational Persuasion as Paternalism." Philosophy & Public Affairs, 42(1), 78-112.
  • Westlund, A. C. (2012). "Autonomy in Relation." In S. L. Crasnow & A. M. Superson (Eds.), Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy (pp. 59–81). Oxford University Press.
  • Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard‐Snyder, D. (2017). "Intellectual Humility: Owning our Limitations." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94, 509– 539.
  • Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard-Snyder, D. (2021). "The Puzzle of Humility and Disparity." In M. Alfano, M. Lynch, & A. Tanesini (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility (pp. 72-83). Routledge.
  • Zagzebski, L. (2007). "Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy." Episteme, 4, 252–263.
  • Zagzebski, L. (2013). "Intellectual Autonomy." Philosophical Issues, 23, 244–261.
  • Zagzebski, L. (2012). Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford University Press